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and by the incontestability clause, without the construction given by
the court.
To have admitted the unattached application in the Donatz case
would not have been unfair to the beneficiary when, obviously, the
application alone would not have been enough to prove fraud. If
corroborating evidence had substantiated the claim that the appli-
cation contained fraudulent statements, then certainly the bene-
ficiary would not have been deprived of anything due him.27
RAYMOND R. Roeitcirr, JR.
FAIR TRADE CONTRACTS UNDER THE NEW VIRGINIA
FAIR TRADE ACT*
In the past decade, the constitutional validity of state fair trade
acts has been litigated at a steadily increasing rate.' Every state which
had considered the validity of its fair trade act prior to 1949 had up-
held it, but in that year the Florida Supreme Court declared the
Florida Fair Trade Act unconstitutional.2 A later re-enactment of
this statute was held invalid because it contained a "nonsigner"
clause3 which required nonconsenting retailers to abide by minimum
retail prices established in a contract between the manufacturer and
one or more other retailers. Since that time, the nonsigner clause
'In certain cases they might be entitled to a refund of the premiums paid by
the insured.
*The scope of this comment is limited to the constitutional aspects of state fair
trade acts, and the Virginia Fair Trade Act in particular. As was stated by the
Kentucky Supreme Court:
"We are not concerned with the economic and social philosophy of such laws or
the wisdom of the legislation. We are concerned only with the question of whether
it is vnthin the power of the Legislature. to enact a statute which sanctions the
fixing of minimum retail prices as described." General Elec. Co. v. American Buyers
Cooperative, Inc., 316 S.W.2d 354, 358 (Ky. 1958).
For a penetrating account of some economic aspects of fair trade see Fulda,
Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 175 (1954). See also Bates, Constitu-
tionality of State Fair Trade Acts, 32 Ind. L.J. 127 (1957).
1See table in appendix.
zThe court held the act unconstitutional as a price fixing measure which did
not fall within the state's police power. Laquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling
Corp., 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
sMiles Labs., Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d 68o (Fla. 1954). See table in appendix.
For a more detailed discussion of the history of the Florida Fair Trade Acts and the
effect of federal legislation thereon, see Bates, Constitutionality of State Fair Trade
Acts, 32 Ind. LJ. 127, 134-37 (1957)-
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of these acts has been declared unconstitutional by the courts of last
resort in seventeen other states4
The original Virginia Fair Trade Act5 was declared invalid in
1956 by the trial court in Benrus Watch Co. v. Kirsch6 on two sepa-
rate grounds: (i) It was repealed by implication by a later statute;
and (2) the nonsigner clause was unconstitutional. This decision
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, but only
on the ground that the act was repealed by the later anti-monopoly
statute,7 thus leaving the constitutionality of the act undecided.
In 1958 the General Assembly enacted a new fair trade act8 in
'See table in appendix.
"mhe trend of recent cases is to strike down the nonsigner clause Since
1951 [until 1958], the courts of last resort of thirteen states considering the ques-
tion for the first time, eleven declared the nonsigner clause to be in violation of
their respective constitutions while only two upheld it." Quality Oil Co. v. E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 182 Kan. 488, 322 P.2d 731, 735 (1958).
"Va. Acts of 1938, ch. 413.
di98 Va. 94, 92 S.E.2d 384 (1956).
Wa. Code Ann. §§ 59-20 to 59-40 (195o).
'Va. Code Ann. §§ 59-8.1 to 59-8.9 (Supp. i96o). Sec. 59-8.3 of the act provides
"No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears, or the label
or container of which bears, the trade-mark or trade name of the producer or dis-
tributor of such commodity and which commodity is in free and open competition
with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others shall
be deemed in violation of any law of the state by reason of any of the following
provisions which may be contained in such contract:
(a) That the buyer will not resell such commodity at less than the minimum
price stipulated by the seller '.
Sec. 59-8.2 provides: "The following terms, as used in this chapter, are hereby
defined as follows:
(i) 'Commodity' means any subject of commerce, except meat and meat products,
meal, flour, bakery products, fresh and canned fish, sea food, fresh and canned
fruits and vegetables, coffee, tea, ice, sugar and wearing apparel
(io) 'Contract' means any agreement, written or verbal, or actual notice im-
parted by mail or attached to the commodity or containers thereof.
The acceptance of a commodity for resale, after notice imparted by mail or
attached to the commodity or containers thereof, shall be prima facie evidence of
actual notice of the terms of the 'contract.' Acceptance for resale with actual notice
shall be deemed to be assent to the terms of the 'contract'."
The purposes of the act are expressed in § 59-8.9: "This chapter is enacted in
the exercise of the police powers of the Commonwealth, and its purposes are gen-
erally to protect and preserve small business, to safeguard the goodwill of trade-
marks and trade names, to further wholesome competition "
The definition of "commodity" in § 59-8.2 (i) above, appears to have excluded
some items while retaining others which are very similar in nature. For example,
honey and maple syrup are included but sugar is not; postum and other hot or
cold drinks are included but coffee and tea are not. A United States Supreme Court
case which may give a basis for some of the exceptions in this definition is New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). In that case Mr. Justice Sutherland
said: "It [the ice business] is a business as essentially private in its nature as the
business of the grocer, the dairyman, the butcher, the baker, the shoemaker, or the
1961]
178 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
which the nonsigner dause was apparently deleted, and the scope of
the term "contract" was extended to include the situation where a
retailer has "actual notice [of fair trade prices) imparted by mail or
attached to the commodity or containers thereof." 9 This extension
seems to place the retailer in a position where, although he has not
expressly agreed to abide by fair trade prices, he is deemed to have
done so. The new law was tested in Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec.
Co.,lO a declaratory judgment proceeding. The stipulated facts were
that the General Electric Company provided a schedule of min-
imum retail prices and advised the Standard Drug Company that
it was fair trading flashbulbs in Virginia. Standard purchased G. E.
flashbulbs after receiving this notice and resold them at less than
the fair trade prices. There was no express agreement as to fair trade
prices. Whether Standard did or did not intend, at the time it ac-
cepted the flashbulbs, to sell them at less than the specified minimum
prices was not stipulated. Nor was it stipulated that G. E. knew, at
the time it shipped the flashbulbs, of such an intention on the part
of Standard. The principal contention of Standard was that the
Virginia Fair Trade Act was unconstitutional in that it violated the
due process," equal protection,' 2 and delegation of powers13 clauses of
the Virginia Constitution. G. E. contended that the act was constitu-
tional and that Standard, by accepting the flashbulbs with notice of
the fair trade prices, agreed not to sell them at less than those mini-
mum prices. The trial court refused the motion for a declaratory
judgment of unconstitutionality and Standard appealed. The judg-
ment of the trial court was affrmed by the Supreme Court of Appeals
on the theory that, by accepting the flashbulbs, a voluntary contract
was created in which Standard agreed not to sell the flashbulbs at
less than the fair trade prices.
tailor ... And this court has defirntelv said that the production or sale of food
or clothing cannot be subjected to legislative regulation. ." 285 U.S. at 277. The
scope of this comment will not permit further inquiry into this interesting problem.
"Va. Code Ann. § 59-8.2(0o) (Supp. i96o).
"2o2 Va. 367, 1i7 S.E.2d 289 (ig6o).
"That no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of
law... Va. Const. art. I, § i i.
"'The authority of the General Assembly shall extend to all subjects of legis-
lation, not herein forbidden or restricted..
The General Assembly shall not enact any local, special or private law in the
following cases:.
12. Regulating labor, trade, mining or manufacturing..
18. Granting to any private corporation, association, or individual any special
or exclusive right, privilege or immunity." Va. Const. art. IV, § 63.
2'"The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a General Assembly
Va. Cost. art. IV, § 40.
VIRGINIA COMMENTS
Fair trade acts in some other states accomplish the same result
as the Virginia act by a different method. Instead of creating a
contract between the nonsigning retailer and the manufacturer, these
acts state that the terms of a fair trade agreement between the man-
ufacturer and one or more retailers are binding on all other retailers
with notice thereof regardless of whether they consented to be bound
or not.1 4 It is this nonsigner clause which has been subjected to
constitutional attack in many states.
Those cases in which the nonsigner clause has been held invalid
on constitutional grounds have generally held that the act, insofar
as it requires nonconsenting retailers to abide by the minimum price
provisions of a fair trade contract, (i) violates due process of law; (2)
unlawfully delegates legislative power to private persons; or (3) de-
nies equal protection of the laws.15
In General Elec. Co. v. Wahle'6 the Oregon Fair Trade Act,
insofar as it related to persons who had not consented to be bound
by fair trade prices, was held to have violated the due process of law
provision of the Oregon Constitution. The right of an owner to
sell his property at a price agreeable to him was held to be a valuable
property right which the legislature could not take away except in a
lawful exercise of police power to protect the public welfare. The
Oregon court said that "to be a valid exercise of the police power,
the statute and the regulations thereunder must have a well-recognized
and direct bearing upon the health, happiness, and well-being of the
public as a whole."' 7 The court held that the establishment of
minimum retail prices of electrical appliances and devices was not so
related to the public welfare as to be a valid exercise of police power.
The Kansas court, in Quality Oil Co. v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co.,is held the Kansas Fair Trade Act unconstitutional as ap-
plied to a retailer who did not consent to maintain the fixed mini-
mum prices in the sale of "Zerex" anti-freeze. The court did not
accept an implied assent theory advanced by the defendant. It said:
uThe wording of the nonsigner clause is almost uniform throughout all fair
trade acts. The old Virginia nonsigner clause stated: "Wilfully and knowingly adver-
using, offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in
any contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of this act, whether the person
so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is
unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby."
Va. Acts 1938, ch. 413, § 6.
'sRemington Arms Co. v. C.E.M. of St. Louis, Inc., 1o2 NAV.2d 528 (Minn. 196o).
See also table in appedix.
"'207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956).
17Id. at 644.
"182 Kan. at 488, 322 P.2d 731 (1958).
1961]
x8o WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
"A trade-mark owner is thus empowered to determine whether
the provisions of the law z.e., the nonsigner clause, shall be
placed into operation, and, if placed into operation, to what
commodities it shall apply and what minmum prices it shall
make binding on nonsigning parties, and is also empowered to
amend or alter the operation of the law by changing minimum
prices, by eliminating or adding commodities, and fixing min-
imum prices for those added. In short, the trade-mark owner is
privileged to place the law into effect, and to amend or alter
it at his whim or caprice."'19
The court held that this provision was unconstitutional as a delega-
tion of legislative powers to private persons.
The Nebraska Supreme Court declared that state's Fair Trade
Act unconstitutional for a variety of reasons. In McGraw Elec. Co.
v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 20 the court, in holding that the nonsigner
clause violated the equal protection or special privilege or immuni-
ty provision of the Nebraska Constitution, said:
"It permits the impairment and destruction of the right
of any retailer... from freely selling such commodities to his
customers ....
"These aspects of grant are limited, as is dear, only to
contracting parties.... To all others engaged in trade and com-
merce as producers, wholesalers, distributors, and retailers the
grants and privileges of the act are denied."21
Of the other courts which have considered the constitutionality
of state fair trade acts, some have found them unconstitutional for
these or other reasons22 while others have sustained the validity of
the statutes.23 The table in the appendix to this comment gives the
status of the constitutionality of nonsigner clauses in those states in
which they have been considered by the state court of last resort
since 1949.
On the stipulated facts in the Standard case, the court apparent-
ly felt that the statutory "contract" had been created by the vol-
untary acceptance of the flashbulbs with notice of the fair trade
prices. The statute provides that the term "'contract' means any
agreement, written or verbal, or actual notice imparted by mail or
'"Id. at 737.
mi59 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608 (1955).
2Id. at 616.
'See Annot., 6o A.L.R.2d 420 (1958).
2The courts which have sustained the constitutional validity of state fair trade
acts have usually relied heavily on Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers
Corp., 299 U.S. 183, (1936). See cases cited in the appendix. See also Fulda, Resale
Price Maintenance, 21 U. Cli. L. Rev. 175 (1954).
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attached to the commodity or containers thereof." 24 If Standard ac-
cepted the flashbulbs with the intention of being bound by the fair
trade prices, this would create the contract established by the act. In
addition, even if Standard did not intend to be bound, the objective
manifestation of intent shown by acceptance with notice would pre-
clude a subsequent denial of the existence of the contract. Standard,
in other words, would not be allowed to enjoy the benefits of a con-
tract while secretly refusing to accept other terms of the contract.
Thus, with regard to the statutory contract in this case, Standard's
subjective intent is immaterial.
However, a retailer's intent may be material if the manufacturer
knew when it shipped the merchandise that the retailer did not
consent to be bound by the fair trade prices. That is, if Standard had
notified G. E. that it refused to abide by the fair trade prices, and
G. E. had subsequently filled Standard's order, an entirely differ-
ent problem would have been presented. The constitutional objec-
tions raised by Standard would have to be viewed in a different
perspective since the contract could no longer be considered volun-
tary.
Another situation in which the retailer's subjective intent may
be material is that in which there is no direct contract between the
manufacturer and the retailer except the sending by the manufacturer,
and the receipt by the retailer, of the fair trade notice. That situa-
tion would exist if Standard obtained the flashbulbs from sources
other than G. E.'s regular distribution channels in Virginia. In
Standard the statutory contract was created in three steps: (i) Stand-
ard's order of the flashbulbs from G. E., (2) the shipment by G. E., and
(3) the acceptance by Standard with notice. The holding in the case
indicates that possibly only (3) above is necessary for the operation of
the act.2 5 It would therefore seem that acceptance of the flashbulbs
with the intent to be bound by the fair trade prices may give rise to
the fair trade contract regardless of the source of the goods. How-
ever, if there were an intention on the part of Standard not to be
bound by G. E.'s fair trade prices when Standard purchased the
flashbulbs from someone other than G. E., it would seem clear that
there could be no voluntary statutory contract between G. E. and
24Va. Code Ann. § 59-8.2(io) (Supp. 196o).
2sThe court said: "Obviously actual notice imparted by mail or attached to a
commodity, without more, is not a contract. [I]t is quite obvious that the notice is
the offer to make a contract. [A]cceptance with actual notice of the minimum re-
sale price is deemed assent to the terms imposed in the notice. Voluntary acceptance
of the commodity with actual notice of the imposed minimum retail price creates
the contract." 202 Va. 367, 117 S.E.2d 289 (ig6o).
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Standard. This hypothetical situation could occur when a retailer
sold his complete stock of flashbulbs in a liquidation sale or any
similar transaction. 26 If the Virginia statute would allow the crea-
tion of a fair trade contract in this situation, it would seem that,
again, the constitutional objections raised in the Standard case could
not be answered on the premise that the contract was voluntary. The
court in the Standard case said that "the restriction against selling the
trade-marked goods at less than a specified minimum price is limited
to voluntary agreements." 27 Possibly the addition of either of the
suggested facts, i.e., Standard's giving notice to G. E. or Standard's
not buying directly from G. E., would negative the existence of a
voluntary fair trade contract.
If the statutory definition of the term "contract" is held to include
either of these situations, the Virginia retailer would be in the same
position as retailers in other states which have the traditional non-
signer clause. He would apparently be bound by fair trade prices no
matter what action he takes. In either of these situations, the same
question of constitutionality is presented as in the nonsigner cases
cited in the appendix. In those cases, as here, a nonconsenting re-
tailer has been required to submit to the terms of a contract by which
he had no intention to be bound. The only difference in the rights
of a manufacturer against nonconsenting retailers in Virginia and
those in other fair trade states is that in Virginia they are called con-
tract rights while in other states they are not given a special name.
The mechanics of operation of the two different types of acts are the
same except that, under the Virginia procedure, the manufacturer
need not enter into an express fair trade agreement with one or more
other retailers.
It would seem that if the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
is presented with either of the assumed fact situations, the Standard
case will not be determinative; but the authorities cited in the ap-
pendix to this comment will be relevant. If the decision of the Vir-
ginia court upholds the act, then other states may consider the ad-
visability of following the example of the General Assembly of Vir-
ginia. Even if the Virginia court holds the act unconstitutional in
either or both of the assumed fact situations, at least the effect of the
=A situation similar to this, and possibly with the same effect, could occur
if Standard purchased the flashbulbs in a state whch did not have a fair trade
act, or where the nonsigner clause of the act had been declared unconstitutional
or even in a fair trade state with an effective nonsigner clause where G.E. had de-
cided not to fair trade its flashbulbs.
72o2 Va. 367, 117 SX.Ed 289 (if6o).
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fair trade acts might be extended to cover situations such as that
presented in the Standard case, which would not be possible under
other fair trade acts where the nonsigner clause has been declared
unconstitutional. It therefore appears, from the decision in the
Standard case, that the proponents of fair trade may have found an
answer to the trend of decisions declaring the nonsigner clause of
these acts unconstitutional. 28 The present decision indicates that the
effectiveness of the statutes may be preserved, at least partially, with-
out that objectionable clause.29
GERALD E. SMALLWOOD
8See 29 USL. Week 1087 (Dec. 13, 196o).
"This seems inconsistent with the contention of the proponents of fair trade
acts that the nonsigner clause is the backbone of the acts, without which the pur-
poses of the statutes could not be realized. See Quality Oil Co. v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 182 Kan. 488, 322P.2d 731, 736 (1958); General Elec. Co. v. Klein,
34 Del. ch. 491, io6 A.2d 2o6, 2o8 (Sup. Ct. 1954). It appears that, if the Virginia
act is the answer to the constituuonal attack on the nonsigner clause, the act
must have the same effect on nonconsenting retailers as the other acts with a non-
signer clause. See text of this comment following note 26 supra.
,961]
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APPENDIX
States which have considered the constitutional validity of nonsigner
clauses in State Fair Trade Acts since 1949"
State Held Valid Held Invalid
Due Delegation of Equal
Year Year Processf Powers Protection++
Arizona1  1958
Arkansas2  1955 X
California3  1955
Colorado 4  1956 X X X
Delaware5  1954
Florida 6  1954 X X X
Georgia 7  1955 x
Illinois8 1958
Indiana9  1957 x
*The entries in this table are based on the latest decision by the courts of last
resort of the various states. For other decisions before the date listed see the case
cited. The cases cited are limited to decisions directly on the constitutional validity
of the nonsigner clause of the state fair trade acts under the state constitution. De-
cisions on the acts which do not involve the nonsigner clause are not included;
nor are decisions on unfair practices acts, sometimes called unfair sales acts, and
sometimes included within the fair trade act itself. These acts refer to resales below
cost as distinguished from sales below a designated fair trade price. For example,
see State v. Ross, 259 Wis. 379, 48 N.V.2d 46o (195i). Decisions on special statutes
which regulate the resale of particular commodities are not considered. State court
cases which were decided on federal constitutional grounds are not included. See,
e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 333 Mass. 665, 132 N.E.2d 652
(1956) and Bulova Watch Co. v. Anderson, 270 Wis. 21, 70 N.W.2d 243 (1955)-
tDue Process as used here includes impairment of contract rights and freedom
to contract.
TEqual protection as used here includes special legislation giving privileges
or immunities.
'Everybody's Drug Co. v. Duckworth, 84 Ariz. 141, 325 P.2d 400 (1958).
'Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs. 224 Ark. 558, 275
S.W.2d 455 (1955).
sScovilie Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores, 45 Cal. d 881, 291 P.2d 936
(1955).
'Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. x6o, 3o P.2d 139 (1956).
5General Elec. Co. v. Klein, 34 Del. Ch. 491, io6 A.2d 2o6 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
*Miles Labs. Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d 68o (Fla. 1954).
"Cox v. General Elec. Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955).
8Kinsey Distilling Sales Co. v. Foremost Liquor Stores, Inc., 15 Il. 2d 182, 154
N.E.2d 290 (1958).
'Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Shane Co., 237 Ind. 188, 143 N.E.2d 415 (1957).
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State Held Valid Held Invalid
Due Delegation of Equal
Year Year Processt  Powers Protectiont
Kansas' 0  I958 x
Kentucky" 1958 x
Louisiana 2  1956 x
Maryland 13  1956
Michigan 14  1952 x
Minnesota 5  196o x
Nebraska'( 1955 x x x
New Hampshire' 7  196o
New Jersey's 1954
New Mexico' 9  1957 x
New York20  1954
Ohio2 ' 1958 x x x
Oregon 22  1956 x x x
Pennsylvania2s  1955
South Carolina 24  1957 x
Utah25  1956
"Quality Oil Co. v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 182 Kan. 488, 322 P.2d
731 (1958).
'General Elec. Co. v. American Buyers Cooperative, Inc., 316 S.W.2d 354 (Ky.
1958).
"Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts.,
231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956).
"Home Util. Co. v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. 2o9 Md. 6io, 122 A.2d 109 (1956).
21 Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. iog,
54 NAV.2d 268 (1952).
'Remington Arms Co. v. G.E.M. of St. Louis, Inc., 102 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 1966).
"General Elec. Co. v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 159 Neb. 736, 68 N.W.2d 62o (i955).
'Corning Glass Works v. Max Dichter Co., 1o2 N.H. 505, 161 A.2d 569 (196o).
"Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 15 N.J. 191, 1o4 A.2d 304 (1954).
"Skaggs Drug Center v. General Elec. Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957).
"General Elec. Co. v. Masters, Inc., 307 N.Y. 229, 12o N.E.2d 802 (1954).
"Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147
N.E.2d 481 (1958). Ohio re-enacted a fair trade act in 1959, and, though this act
has not been considered by the Ohio Supreme Court, it was declared invalid by a
lower court in Helena Rubenstein, Inc. v. Cinti. Vitamin 9- Cosmetic Distribs. Co.,
167 N.E.2d 687 (Ohio C.P 196o).
"General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 2o 7 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956).
"Burche Co. v. General Elec. CO., 382 Pa. 370, i5 A.2d 361 (1955).
"Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 231 S.C. 636, 99 S.E.2d 665 (1957).
"General Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P.2d 741 (1956)
(violated anti-monoploy provision of constitution).
x961]
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State Held Valid Held Invalid
Due Delegation of Equal





Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 345 P.2d 1o85 (Wash. 1959).
-7General Elec. Co. v. A. Dandy Appliance Co., 143 W Va. 491, 1o3 S.E. 2d 31o
(1958).
